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Adding Bite: A Response to 
State ex rel. McDougall v. Strohson (Cantrell, Real 
Party in Interest)* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
An estimated 18-36% of women are abused by a male partner at some 
point in their lives.' In 1994 nearly 30% of the women murdered were 
killed by a boyfriend or husband.2 The surgeon general has stated that 
every five years domestic violence claims as many lives as did the Viet-
nam War. 3 Recidivism adds to the severity of domestic violence. Studies 
show that 47% of battered women report three or more assaults per year. 4 
Congress has taken active steps in recent legislative sessions to alleviate 
domestic violence, effectively nationalizing the crime with the Violence 
Against Women Act and increasing funding to both shelters and the crim-
inal justice system.5 
Adding to the brutality and repetitive nature of domestic violence, the 
presence of firearms in the abusive home spells disaster. In 1994, the FBI 
documented that guns were utilized in 7 out of 10 murders in the United 
States.6 In testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime in the United 
States House of Representatives, Donna F. Edwards, Executive Director 
of the National Network to End Domestic Violence stated: 
The presence of a firearm in the home poses a significant risk 
to battered women and their children. In a 1992 study of family 
and intimate assaults reported in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, researchers found that firearms were 
* Copyright <D 1998 by Michael S. Wawro. 
I. Domestic Violence Fact Sheet, April 1995 (NOW Legal Defense Fund)(citing Judith 
Avis, Where are All the Family Therapist_,., Abuse and Violence Within Families and Fwnilv 
Therapy's Response, 18 J. Of MARITAL AND FAMILY THERAPY 225, 227 (July 1992)) See also 
Ellen Schuerman, Establish in!! a Tort Dutv ./(ir Police Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence, 
34 ARIZ. L. REV. 355 ( 1992) Schuerman states: "Up to 60% of all married women suffer physical 
abuse at the hands of their spouses at some time during marriage." !d at 355. 
2. Domestic Violence Fact Sheet, supra note I 
3. Schuerman, supra note I, at 355 (citing Diane Klein, Domestic Violence Isn't Tame -
It's a Wild, UiilY Crime, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992, at E I (quoting United States Surgeon General 
Antonia Novella)). 
4. Guns and the Domestic Violence Chanlie to Ownership Ban Bej(Jre the Subcommittee 
on Crime of the House o{ Representatives Judiciary Conumttee, 1997 WL 96523 (F.D.C.H) 
( 1997)[hereinafter Edward's Te.\·timony](tcstimony of Donna F. Edwards. Executive Director, 
National Network to End Domestic Violence). 
5. !d. at *2. 
6. !d. 
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three times more likely to result in deaths than assaults involv-
ing knives or other cutting instruments and 23.4 times more 
likely to result in death than family and intimate assaults in-
volving other weapons or bodily force. Overall, family and 
intimate assaults involving firearms are 12 times more likely to 
result in death than all non-firearm family and intimate as-
saults.7 
With the passage of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9), popularly known as the 
Lautenberg Amendment, the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban addi-
tion to the Brady Bill addressed the lethal mixture of firearms and domes-
tic abuse.8 Effectively, the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban disal-
lows any person convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence charge 
from purchasing or owning a firearm.9 While this legislation has been 
lauded as a major step forward towards protecting the victims of domestic 
violence, its ramifications have stirred considerable controversy in the 
areas of law enforcement, the military, and jury entitlement, the last of 
which is the focus of this article.10 
This note explores State ex rel. McDougall v. Strohson (Cantrell, 
Real Party in Interest)11 which addresses an application of the Domestic 
Violence Offender Gun Ban and suggests that the Arizona Supreme Court 
should do away with the cumbersome and inconsistent results of the 
Rothweiler test for determining jury entitlement and instead, fall into line 
with the federal standard as laid out in Blanton v. City of North Las Ve-
7. /d. at 3, (citing L.E. Saltzman et a!., Weapon Involvement and Injury, Outcomes in 
Family and Intimate Assaults, 267 JAMA 22 (1992)). See also A. Kellerman et al., Gun 
Ownership As A Risk Factor For Homicide In the Home, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1084 (1993) In 
a study of three counties in Tennessee, Washington, and Ohio, researchers found that the risk of 
homicide is markedly increased in homes where a person has previously been hit or hurt in a 
family fight. In 31.8 of the cases there were reports that someone in the house had previously been 
hit or hurt. /d. at I 084. 
8. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9) (West 
1997) (referred to as Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban). It reads: 
!d. 
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess 
in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce." 
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9). 
I 0. Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 32 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1935 (Oct. 7, 1996). President Clinton was pleased with the passage of the 
Domestic Violence Offenders Gun Ban, which he supported, in his signing of the law, he stated: 
"As I had urged, the bill also extends the Brady Bill to ensure that those who commit domestic 
violence cannot purchase guns." /d. at 1936. See also Proclamation No. 6927, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,677 
(1996). 
II. 945 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1997). 
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gasY In its decision, the Arizona Supreme Court, while attempting to 
enable some of the most significant consequences ever proposed for do-
mestic violence perpetrators, did so in a matter that belittles both the is-
sues of domestic violence and firearms ownership. 
Part II of this Note gives a brief background of the Lautenberg 
Amendment, domestic violence laws in Arizona and the right to a jury. 
Part III provides a short synopsis of State ex rei. McDougall v. Strohson 
(Cantrell, Real Party in Interest) and explains the Arizona Supreme 
Court's reasoning in this case. Part IV looks at the interesting marriage of 
federal and state jurisprudence in the ruling and examines the confusing 
and inconsistent results of applying the Rothweiler standard while look-
ing at some of the possible underlying motives that continue to fuel the 
application of this test. This note concludes that while McDougall seem-
ingly attempted to add bite to domestic violence prosecutions, it did so in 
such a manner that treaded over the importance of the right to a jury trial, 
degraded the issue of domestic violence and effectively disabled the Ban 
from being applied to cases in Arizona. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Two Approaches to Combating Domestic Violence 
Two distinct schools of thought to addressing the epidemic of domes-
tic violence have been developed in the past several years. The first ap-
proach, the "hard" approach, posits that domestic violence is a serious 
crime that deserves harsh consequences. The second approach, the "soft" 
approach, argues that the greatest benefit is gained through maximizing 
conviction rates. 
The hard approach maximizes penalties and treatment for domestic 
violence abusers. Federal laws, such as the Domestic Violence Handgun 
Ban, send a message to would be abusers that harsh consequences will 
result from spouse battering. Yet, gains in sentencing severity tend to 
give up ground to efficiency. The harsher the sentence, the stronger the 
need for a jury trial and the harder to get the conviction. In times of lim-
ited resources in prosecutors' offices, this means fewer abusers brought 
to justice in the courtroom. 
The soft approach gives up severity in exchange for higher conviction 
rates. Lowering domestic violence crimes to misdemeanors has allowed 
local prosecutors to participate in a quicker, more efficient non-jury set-
12. 489 U.S. 538 (1989). 
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ting, leading to higher conviction rates which address the needs of an in-
creased number of victims in their communities. Arizona's designation of 
domestic violence assault as a Class I misdemeanor is a good example of 
this school of thought. 
While the debate continues over which approach is more effective in 
curbing domestic violence, both have had success. The issues raised in 
this casenote are the problems that occur when a court attempts to com-
bine these two polar approaches. 
B. The Laufenberg Amendment 
The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, HR 3610, 
was approved on September 30, 1996.13 Partially due to the late date of its 
consideration in the session, the Lautenberg Amendment flew through 
both houses of Congress without hearings and with relatively little con-
troversy. 
The Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban (the "Ban"), which wound 
it's way through Congress to passage without much fanfare, has become a 
political hotspot since its passage. Because it does not contain any excep-
tions, specifically for military personnel or law enforcement officers, un-
like other provisions in the Brady Bill, the Ban has created significant 
controversy. 14 Due to considerable backlash and pressure from police or-
ganizations, several proposals have arisen during the last Congressional 
term to limit the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban, including allow-
ing exceptions for police officers and military personnel and limiting the 
retroactivity of the Ban. 15 Women's groups and domestic violence lobbies 
are trying to prevent these limitations, arguing that abusers should not be 
allowed to hide behind the badge or their uniform. 16 
13. See Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 
10. 
14. See generally, Spousal Abuse Conviction Could Disarm Police, AZ REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 
1996, at A30. 
15. See generally Bruce T. Smith, Disarming the Soldier, 44 FED. LAW. 16 (May 1997). 
16. See generally Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearings on 
The Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban of 1996 & H.R. 261445 Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1997 W.L. I 09068 (F.D.C.H.) (1997) [hereinafter 
Smith Testimony](written testimony of Rita Smith, Executive Director, and Pamela Coukos, Public 
Policy Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence). See also Edwards Testirrumy, 
supra note 4. Edwards states: 
In testimony before the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families 
during the l02nd Congress, Dr. Leanor B. Johnson (Family Studies, Arizona 
State University) stated that 40 percent of police officers reported that in the 
last six months prior to the survey they had behaved violently towards their 
spouse or children. In another survey, approximately 41 percent of police 
officers reported marital conflicts involving physical aggression during a 
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Very recently, one of these challenges made its way through the court 
system with a decision in the United States Court of Appeals, District of 
Columbia Circuit. In Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 17 the 
court found that although a special focus on domestic violence was ratio-
nal, the Ban's sole treatment of misdemeanors violated equal protection 
principles. 
We think the most appropriate remedy is consequently to hold 
that § 925 is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to withhold 
the public interest exception from those convicted of domestic 
violence misdemeanors. The government may not bar such 
people from possessing firearms in the public interest while it 
imposes a lesser restriction in those convicted of crimes that 
differ in only being more serious. Of course we do not decide 
whether a broader revocation of the public interest excep-
tion-for example, from all those convicted of any crime of 
domestic violence-would be constitutional. 18 
Whether this case goes any further or whether Congress decides to in-
clude the exception in the Ban or exclude it for all domestic violence per-
petrators remains to be seen. The hard approach would suggest that the 
public interest exception be done away with altogether. 
While the continuing vitality of the Ban may be in question, its prac-
ticality is also debatable. 19 The National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System (NICBS), which compiles the database used for other as-
pects of the Brady Bill, is years away from being able to catalog or flag 
those misdemeanor cases needed to effectuate the Ban. In testimony from 
Gerry Wethington, on behalf of SEARCH, The National Consortium for 
conflict during the previous year. These overall rates of violence are 
considerably higher than those reported for a random sample of civilians and 
somewhat higher than military samples." /d. at 3. 
17. 152 F. 3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
18. /d. at 1004. 
19. Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1997 WL 128153 (F.D.C.H) ( 1997) [hereinafter 
Loesch Statement](statement of David R. Loesch, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation). Mr. Loesch states: 
"With the enactment of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, a 
portion of our record flagging system lost its value. Since certain 
misdemeanor convictions now prohibit persons from possessing a firearm, the 
users can no longer ignore the records flagged as having. . .only a 
misdemeanor conviction ... In most cases, one cannot ascertain by looking 
at the record which arrests are for domestic violence crimes. Further. there 
is no automated way the FBI can go back into the records and identify such 
arrests or convictions." /d. at 3. 
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Justice Information and Statistics, it was estimated that it would take sev-
eral years and hundreds of millions of dollars before the system would 
become equipped for the Ban to become fully viable?0 Until that time, if 
the Ban survives legislative and possible judicial challenges, it will only 
be enforceable as hit and miss at best. 
Setting aside it's application difficulties, the Ban may also face con-
stitutionality problems due to recent decisions concerning other portions 
of the Brady Bill. In U.S. v. Lopez 21 the Court struck down a provision 
creating gun free school zones under the commerce power because of the 
non-commercial nature of the regulation. Since the scope and effect of 
Lopez has not yet been determined, it has yet to be seen whether national-
ization of the crime of domestic violence under the Violence Against 
Women Act (VA WA) will remain constitutionally valid.22 Although not 
likely to be struck down, if VA W A is abolished, it seems that a similar 
constitutional question could also be raised concerning the Ban.23 
Whether the Ban independently violates Due Process by indefinitely sus-
pending gun ownership rights for a crime specifically categorized as a 
misdemeanor and possibly without the benefit of a jury is another possi-
bility for a constitutional challenge. 
In spite of the looming challenges, the Ban still constitutes an excel-
lent example of the hard, get tough on domestic violence trend in legisla-
tion. One author recently noted that: 
The Act has brought Domestic Violence, once an unspoken 
crime, to the forefront of legislation. However, critics exclaim 
that the Act is wrought with obstacles. Besides the problems 
with retroactivity and the application to officers of the law and 
military, this Amendment has some unavoidable loopholes and 
unintended consequences which might prevent the act from 
being fully successful. However, not all laws are flawless, and 
sometimes they do not work out their glitches until they are 
enforced for awhile. 24 
20. Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban Before the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 1997 WL 96522 (F.D.C.H.) (1997) [hereinafter 
Wethington Testimony](testimony of Gerry Wethington, Director, Information Systems, Missouri 
Highway Patrol on behalf of SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and 
Statistics). 
21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
22. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 103-322. 
194 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796, 1902 (codified in various titles of U.S.C.). 
23. For a very good article regarding the constitutionality of VAWA, see Kerrie E. Maloney, 
Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (1996). 
24. Melanie L. Mecka, Seizing the Ammunition from Domestic Violence: Prohibiting the 
Ownership of Firearms by Abusers, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 607, 638 ( 1998). 
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Mecca continues: 
For maximum effectiveness, the federal and state legislators 
need to vigorously promote the Act, the judiciary needs to rule 
on the Act with a heavy hand, and the local and state law en-
forcement agencies need to put their differences about the Act 
aside and make sure the Act is enforced at all scenes of domes-
tic violence if the Lautenberg Act is going to reduce the num-
ber of domestic homicides. 25 
C. Domestic Violence Law in Arizona 
Domestic violence is defined in the Arizona Revised Statutes as: 
... any act which is a dangerous crime against children ... or 
an offense defined in § 13-1201 through 13-1204 ... if the 
relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of 
marriage or former marriage or of person of the opposite sex or 
having resided in the same household, if the victim and defen-
dant or the defendant's spouse are related to each other by con-
sanguinity or affinity to the second degree, if the victim and 
defendant have a child in common or if the victim or the defen-
dant is pregnant by the other party.26 
191 
Under this definition, domestic violence is a procedural designation of 
A.R.S. § 13-1201-04, and not a separate punishable offense.27 Therefore, 
Domestic Violence is included in the Arizona Criminal Code as Assault, 
which is a misdemeanor, and can also be applied to a number of other 
crimes to designate them as domestic violence as well.Z8 In the 
McDougall case, Dale Cantrell was charged with a Class I misdemeanor 
designated as domestic violence.29 
Arizona law has a number of provisions to combat the ills of domes-
tic violence in addition to the easier conviction standard under the misde-
meanor label. A.R.S. § 13-3601 provides for mandatory arrest of domes-
tic violence perpetrators and also exempts self defense from being con-
sidered an act of domestic violence. A.R.S. § 13-3601.1 mandates coun-
seling for domestic violence offenders. Orders of protection are available 
25. /d. at 637. 
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 13-3601 (1997). 
27. State v. Schackart, 737 P.2d 398 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203 (1997). 
29. State ex rei. McDougall v. Strohson (Cantrell, Real Party in Interest), 945 P.2d 1251, 
125 I (Ariz. 1997). 
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for domestic violence victims as well.30 The Order of Protection can be 
granted ex parte in any court of the State or after a hearing. An Emer-
gency Order of Protection may be issued in situations, such as weekends 
and holidays, when the court is not available.31 These Emergency Orders 
can be authorized over the telephone by a judicial officer to the law en-
forcement officer on the scene. The Emergency Order, unless continued 
by the court, is then valid until the close of the next day of judicial busi-
ness.32 Lastly, Arizona also allows for Injunctions Against Harassment. 33 
Although these orders are also widely used in other contexts, such as 
landlord/tenant, they are valuable in the field of domestic violence be-
cause they do not require any specific relationship between the parties. 
Although not within the scope of this Note, Arizona also provides a well-
equipped, advanced network of social services throughout the state, in-
cluding shelters and counseling, for victims of domestic violence. 
Although the Orders of Protection address firearm usage by the de-
fendant, these Orders are limited in their temporal scope, the inclusion of 
the firearm restriction is voluntary by the petitioner asking for the order, 
and many victims of domestic violence, for whatever reason, do not seek 
Orders of Protection at all. Therefore, although Arizona has a number of 
progressive measures addressing domestic violence, the Ban with its 
mandatory application, reaches farther than any Arizona statute in pre-
venting further, lethal abuse to battered women by firearms. 
D. The Right to a Jury Trial in Criminal Cases 
The problem that the Arizona Supreme Court created with its deci-
sion in McDougall centers around the right to a jury trial in criminal 
cases. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury in criminal cases is one of the 
most fundamental rights embodied in the Bill of Rights, and a distinctive 
element of the American judicial process. "So important was the right to 
criminal jury trial that it was one of the few rights enumerated in the Con-
stitution as originally proposed. In addition, the right to criminal jury trial 
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602 (1997). The Order of Protection may: I) Enjoin the 
defendant from committing an act of domestic violence; 2) Grant exclusive use and possession of 
the parties' residence if physical harm otheiWise may result; 3) Restrain the defendant from coming 
near the residence, place of employment, or school of the plaintiff or other designated persons; 4) 
Prohibit the defendant from possessing a firearm or require the transfer of a firearm to an 
appropriate law enforcement agency, upon a finding that the defendant may inflict on the plaintiff 
serious bodily injury or death; 5) Require the defendant to participate in counseling or other 
appropriate programs; 6) Include any other relief necessary. /d. 
31. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 13-3624 (1997). 
32. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3624 (1997). 
33. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 12-1809 (1997). 
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was the only right provided in all state constitutions drafted between 
1776 and 1787 ."34 
Jury trials are however, not guaranteed in all criminal cases. In 1989, 
the Supreme Court in Blanton established what has become the modem 
petty offense exception to a jury trial.35 In a federal setting, according to 
Murphy, if a maximum authorized term of incarceration for a charge is 
not over six months, the defendant has a burden to show that the statutory 
penalties are severe enough to warrant a jury trial. A three prong test de-
termines whether a jury trial is granted: 1) the degree of dangerousness or 
moral gravity inherent in the offense; 2) the historical treatment of the 
offense; and 3) the severity of the of the penalties attached to the of-
fense.36 Generally, in determining these factors, the court has focused on 
the length of the sentence or as to how the non-incarcerating punishment 
equates to jail time.37 Recently, the court has found that multiple petty 
offenses, even if the conglomerate effect of the sentences exceeds six 
months, are not afforded jury trials. 38 
The Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban poses an intriguing sce-
nario to the petty offense exception doctrine. Originally construed as fel-
onies, local domestic violence statutes carried punishments that easily 
qualified them for jury trial. When dropped to misdemeanors, the new 
domestic violence statutes lost their jury entitlement under the length of 
incarceration prong. No juries meant quicker and increased convictions of 
abusers. Now, with the stiff consequences of the Ban attached to misde-
meanors, the question raised is, whether losing the right to bear arms is a 
severe enough penalty to merit a jury trial for domestic violence misde-
meanors regardless of the petty offense exception doctrine? Although this 
question has not yet been addressed, the continuing vitality of the law 
may depend on its answer. In the absence of a definitive statement, the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, charged with enforcing the 
act, has stated its' policy as no conviction under the Ban unless it is 
reached by ajury.39 
34. Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 133 (1997). 
35. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1996). 
36. See Murphy, supra note 32, at 134. 
37. !d. 
38. See id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996)). 
39. Mecka, supra note 24, at 638 citing Federal Gun Law Expands, LAS VEGAS REV. J., 
Dec. 10, 1996. at 38. 
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Ill. STATE Ex REL. MCDOUGALL V. STROHSON (CANTRELL, REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST) 
A. Facts 
Dale Cantrell was charged with simple assault designated as a domes-
tic violence offense. The charge alleged abuse of a sixteen year old male 
who was the son of Cantrell's girlfriend. Cantrell did not challenge the 
domestic violence designation of the charge and acknowledged that mis-
demeanor assaults were not historically given juries, but instead asked for 
a jury trial on the grounds that if convicted, he would lose his right to 
own or purchase firearms under the recently passed Domestic Violence 
Offender Gun Ban and that this consequence was significant enough to 
warrant a jury trial. The Hon. Macolm Strohson, Magistrate of the Phoe-
nix Municipal Court, agreed with this position and granted Cantrell a jury 
trial. The State, through the Phoenix City Attorney, with no opportunity 
to otherwise appeal this criminal action, sought special relief from the 
Arizona Supreme Court. The court granted the special action and sat en 
bane in its decision. 
B. Reasoning 
1. Special action jurisdiction 
McDougall begins by setting forth the reasons for which the Arizona 
Supreme Court granted jurisdiction in this special action. First, because 
of the nature of the criminal trial process, the State had no other "equally 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal."40 Second, citing domestic 
violence statistics for the State, the court determined that resolution of 
this matter would have statewide impact.41 Third, the issue presented was 
one of pure law and did not require the court to act as a fact finder. 42 
Lastly, jury entitlement is an issue accorded special action in the Arizona 
Supreme Court.43 
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2. Development of Arizona law to date 
Although not to be the result in this case, the court declared that Ari-
zona has historically given greater access to jury trials than the federal 
government. Under Federal case law, a crime punishable by less than six 
months incarceration is not entitled to a jury trial. 44 Although exceptions 
apply where other significant consequences occur that might allow a jury 
trial, the court discounted these exceptions as "rarely, if ever ... ap-
plied."45 
In contrast to the federal standard, Arizona utilizes a three prong test 
developed in Rothweiler v. Superior Court46 which takes into consider-
ation the length of the incarceration as highly important, but also exam-
ines the "moral quality of the act charged" and "its relationship to com-
mon law crimes."47 Under this test, slightly modified by the Dolny case, 
Arizona has granted jury trials to DUI' s while the federal courts have 
not.48 In the realm of shoplifting, the court determined the crime was one 
of moral turpitude and because of its relationship to the common law of 
larceny, also granted a jury trial.49 Most recently the court granted a jury 
trial for charges of possession of marijuana and expanded its view on 
moral turpitude to conclude that the consequence of decreased employ-
ment opportunities justified a jury trial. 50 
After laying this background, the court in McDougall first reasoned 
that the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban would only effect employ-
ment in limited areas, not rising to the same level of diminished employ-
ment opportunities as a marijuana conviction. 51 Next, the court examined 
its history once again, and treating the domestic violence charge identi-
cally as other misdemeanor assault charges, determined that it has never 
extended the right of a jury trial to these sort of cases. The common law 
equivalent to misdemeanor assault was simple battery and did not rise to 
the level of moral turpitude. 52 
44. !d. at 1252. 
45. !d. 
46. 410 P.2d 479 (Ariz. 1966). 
47. See McDougall, 945 P.2d at 1252; State v. Dolny, 778 P.2d 1193 (Ariz. 1989). 
48. Rothweiler, 410 P.2d at 486. 
49. State v. Superior Ct., 589 P.2d 48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). 
50. !d. 
51. See McDougall, 945 P.2d at 1253. 
52. Bruce v. State, 614 P.2d 813, 815 (Ariz. 1980). 
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3. Arizona Domestic Violence Laws 
The court next determined whether the special "domestic violence" 
designation given by the Arizona legislature in the criminal statutes cre-
ated a distinction from traditional misdemeanor assault. While the court 
recognized that the addition of domestic violence to the statute created 
procedural changes, it relied on earlier court of appeals decisions that 
refused to distinguish it as a separate substantive offense. 53 Since domes-
tic violence is not a different substantive offense than misdemeanor as-
sault, the above mentioned analysis for both relation to common law 
crime and moral quality remain the same and it is not afforded any spe-
cial right to jury entitlement. 
4. The Federal Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
While there was some question of whether the law can even be ap-
plied in this case, the court assumed for the purposes of resolving this 
issue, that if convicted of the misdemeanor assault charge, the federal 
firearm prohibition would apply to the defendant. 54 
5. Application of Arizona Law to this Case 
The most important section of the court's reasoning starts by immedi-
ately rejecting the notion of substituting the Rothweiler test for that of the 
federal standard. The court then proceeds to delineate its rejection of a 
jury trial in this case under the Rothweiler test. 
Looking to the most important part of the analysis, the potential pun-
ishment, the court recognized that Arizona courts have "traditionally only 
looked to Arizona Law."55 In determining the other two prongs of the 
Rothweiler test, moral quality and the relationship to common law crimes 
as well, the courts have never looked to the collateral consequences of 
laws passed by other jurisdictions.56 The reasoning behind this is largely 
pragmatic. State and local courts should not be subjected to determining 
the applications and complexities of foreign jurisdictions. The court then 
went on to reason that since it would be impossible to know when defen-
dants would or would not be subject to federal law, a jury trial would be-
come compelled whenever requested, constituting a huge burden upon the 
courts. 
53. State v. Simy, 772 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
54. See McDougall, 945 P.2d at 1255. 
55. /d. at 1256. 
56. !d. 
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Lastly, the court very briefly addressed the concern of firearms own-
ership, yet markedly never mentioned the Second Amendment. Very care-
fully limited in the defendant's proposed activities of hunting and self 
protection, the court determined that "while admittedly important to some 
people, [firearm possession] does not present the type of universal conse-
quence we have found in cases invoking a right to jury trial."57 The court 
then cited that some petty offenders can have restricted gun rights on pro-
bation. 58 Since jury trials are not given for these petty offenses, the legis-
lature implicitly determined that possessing a firearm is not a serious 
enough consequence to justify a jury trial. 
6. The Special Concurrence 
In response to the concurrence, which advocated that the court accept 
the federal standard for jury entitlement in lieu of the Rothweiler test, the 
court looked to legislative intent. The concurrence, in the reasoning of the 
court, made references that the legislature intended the court to fall into 
line with federal jury entitlement standards. The court found that the leg-
islature never had such an intent, and even given numerous opportunities 
to do so, it instead decided to codify the holding as to DUI cases in refer-
ence to Rothweiler.59 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. An Interesting Marriage of Federal and State Jurisprudence 
The Arizona criminal statutes have no punishment that extends as far 
as the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban. If the court had utilized the 
federal standard and taken notice of the Ban, there is a possibility that a 
serious consequence exception allowing a jury trial would have been 
granted in McDougall. The court avoided a head on collision with the 
consequences of the federal law by ignoring it, by instituting the 
Rothweiler standard and by refusing to look elsewhere to determine the 
prongs of this test except Arizona statutes. By taking the soft approach to 
domestic violence, the court justified the rejection of a jury trial by defin-
ing the domestic violence charge as a simple misdemeanor assault under 
Arizona law. Yet, by doing so, the court belittled domestic violence and 
trampled the issue of jury entitlement. 
57. !d. at 1257. 
58. !d. 
59. !d. at 1258. 
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Even though McDougall resulted in an important attempt of the court 
to empower the hard approach Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban for 
domestic violence perpetrators, it may not be as effective as it seems on 
first blush. The court, in its opinion, assumed that the federal statute 
would apply to the defendant. This may not, in actual application, be true. 
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Ronald Ozer, Assistant Phoenix City 
Prosecutor, argued that the Ban would apply without a jury trial.60 This 
view is consistent with the federal standard of granting jury trials only 
with sentences of six months or more, absent a statutory requirement to 
the contrary. Yet, Gerry Wethington, on behalf of SEARCH, referring to 
18 U.S .C. § 921, noted in his testimony before Congress, that one of the 
problems of implementing the Ban will be that it will not be effective on 
those convicted without a jury because of such a statutory mandate re-
quiring a jury.61 As stated earlier, the ATF will not enforce the Ban with-
out a jury trial.62 In an attempt to facilitate this statute by ignoring it and 
not requiring a jury trial, the court may have precluded that its potential 
application in Arizona. 
B. A Statement About Domestic Violence 
After reading the court's explanation of why it accepted this special 
action and its citations of the high number of domestic violence cases in 
the State, one is led to believe that the court is genuinely concerned with 
the issue of domestic violence and that this concern is a factor in its deci-
sion. This may be true, since, in effect, the court facilitated a strong anti-
domestic violence statute in its ruling. Yet, upon closer examination, it 
seems apparent that the court was more interested in protecting its over-
crowded dockets than the battered women of the State. 
Using the Rothweiler analysis, the court must not only look at the 
length of the sentence, but also at the moral turpitude of the crime and its 
association to the common law. After giving multiple instances of where 
60. Ronald Ozer, Petition for Special Action and Request for Stay, March II, 
1997(unpublished petition before the Arizona Supreme Court) (on file with author). 
61. See Wethington Testimony, supra note 17. 18 U.S.C. § 921 reads: 
" (B)(i) A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an 
offense [misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] for purposes of this 
chapter, unless ... 
(aa) the case was tried by a jury, or 
(bb) the person knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have the 
case tried by a jury, by guilty plea or otherwise." !d. 
It has not been determined, nor was it determined in the current case, whether this 
would apply to the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban, or whether it would render 
the Ban ineffective under the current Arizona Scheme. If so, the Court may wish to 
reconsider granting a jury trial if it wishes to enable the Ban. 
62. See supra note 39. 
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it used these two prongs to grant a jury trial, the court distinguished this 
case and put domestic violence on a level with other misdemeanor as-
saults. This is a mistake which dangerously degrades the importance of 
domestic violence. 
While domestic violence may or may not be a different substantive 
crime than misdemeanor assault, the motives for its inclusion with this 
misdemeanor must be examined. While many domestic violence incidents 
easily reach the level and intensity of felonies, victims are significantly 
less willing to testify in domestic cases than in other felony assault cases 
because of their close association with the abuser and/or a very real fear 
of retaliation. Because of these difficulties in getting convictions, histori-
cally many domestic violence claims were either dropped or plead to mis-
demeanors.63 Including domestic violence with misdemeanor assaults was 
a means to raise conviction levels in hopes of further protecting the 
abused women.64 The realization that these "misdemeanor" domestic vio-
lence crimes still contained far deadlier characteristics was the very rea-
son for the passage of the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban. Rita 
Smith, the Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence, stated in her testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
Crime that: 
A ... misconception is the argument that all acts of domestic 
violence should be charged as felonies. In most states, domes-
tic violence is considered largely a misdemeanor offense, al-
though injuries to all battered women are at least as serious as 
those incurred in 90% of all violent crimes classified as felo-
nies. As many others have explained, domestic violence con-
victions are very difficult to obtain, and felonies are often plea-
bargained down to misdemeanor charges .... Battered women 
who do not want to be forced to endure a criminal trial may 
welcome a plea bargain if it adequately protects their safety 
and financial status.65 
By not recognizing the severity of the offense regardless of its criminal 
classification, the Court in this case has put a badge of inferiority on one 
of the most foul crimes in our society. 
Since Rothweiler, many issues have come before the court which 
have been considered for jury entitlement. Mentioned earlier, DUI's, mar-
ijuana possession and shoplifting were all adjudged to merit a jury trial. 
63. Smith Testimony, supra note 15, at 4, (citing Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs 
and the State of the Law, CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 383, 386-87 (1994)). 
64. !d. 
65. !d. (Emphasis added). 
200 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
Jury trials are also granted for leaving the scene of an accident and false 
reporting to a law enforcement officer.66 Looking back to the statistics in 
the beginning of the case, it seems that the numbers were not so shocking 
to the court in terms of abuse, but to the docket. That many cases going to 
jury trial would surely be difficult to an already overburdened court sys-
tem in one of the fastest growing areas in the nation. What results, is one 
of the hidden problems of the Rothweiler test. While the test stays un-
changed, the times do not. A hidden fourth practical prong of the test 
could be said to be the ability of the courts to handle the load that enti-
tling any particular category to jury trials would create. Thirty years ago, 
when Rothweiler was decided, the answer to that question was much dif-
ferent than it is today. When a past category took a spot as jury entitled, it 
lessened the practical docket space that the court had to allocate in the 
future. As the docket tightened over time and as populations and cases 
skyrocketed in the past 30 years, the court is now forced to make deci-
sions like the one here, relegating the crime of beating one's wife below 
smoking a joint. 
C. The Right to Bear Arms 
Even though the Second Amendment is a Constitutional right that 
would not automatically have bearing in a state case such as this one, the 
right to bear arms has historically been an important right in the State of 
Arizona. The constitutionality of the Domestic Violence Offender Gun 
Ban in general, or, in the context of jury entitlement, would have to be 
decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. It is the language, al-
beit dicta, that the Arizona Supreme Court used in describing the interest 
of gun ownership which may be as alarming to those concerned with gun 
ownership rights as the court's treatment of domestic violence in this 
case. In its brief treatment of this issue the court stated: 
[W]e believe that to hunt or possess a firearm for self-protec-
tion, while admittedly very important to some people, does not 
present the type of universal grave consequence we have found 
in cases invoking a right to jury trial. Many people would be 
completely unaffected by such a consequence.67 
66. Fredrickson v. Superior Ct., 219 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 32 (1996); Mungarro v. Riley, 826 
P.2d 1215 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
67. State ex rei. McDougall v. Strohson (Cantrell, Real Party in Interest), 945 P.2d 1251, 
1255 (Ariz. 1997). 
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Carefully couched in the specific categories of self-protection and hunt-
ing, the court may be making a very limited statement to what it sees as a 
limited group of people instead of a general statement about the impor-
tance of the right to bear arms. This also could be a result of the same 
minimization that the court used with domestic violence, trying to down-
play the importance of the issue in order to reject the proposal for a jury. 
D. Applying Federal Standards to Jury Entitlement 
To date, the court's so called "greater access to jury trials" has re-
sulted in confusion and ultimately a slap in the face to victims of domes-
tic violence. The concurrence suggests that the court adopt the federal 
standard for determining jury entitlement. This change would be positive 
for several reasons. First of all, it would apply a predictable standard 
which would allow litigants to more efficiently and effectively prepare 
for trial. Secondly, the higher federal standards for jury entitlement 
would allow the Arizona court system to decrease it's docket size, there-
fore enabling the court to give due consideration to issues when requests 
for exceptions to the six month rule are raised. Incidental to the court's 
acceptance of this position would be the ability to review past decisions 
regarding jury entitlement, allowing the court to re-prioritize in relation 
to the Arizona court system's most current practical capacity. Finally 
then, the court could consider the issues of domestic violence and even 
gun rights, in the manner which befits its importance. A decision could 
then be made regarding jury entitlement which addressed the importance 
of domestic violence prevention in our community. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In times of ever increasing dockets, the case by case, or more accu-
rately, category by category approach of the court in granting jury trials 
has resulted in confusing results. In an ever increasing effort towards effi-
ciency, there is the very real danger, as evidenced in this case, that the 
court will relegate more and more important issues to non-jury status 
while less important offenses retain their jury status. Following the fed-
eral guidelines would allow the court, in one fell swoop, to institute effi-
ciency and predictability, while allowing it to re-examine those special 
exceptions that should be granted a jury trial without fear of dangerously 
backlogging the docket. 
Because Arizona does not follow the federal standard for jury entitle-
ment, it remains to be seen whether a misdemeanor domestic violence 
charge, where the possible penalty is an absolute restriction on the right 
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to bear arms, would constitute a harsh enough punishment to warrant a 
jury trial under the federal standard. Indications suggest that the enforcers 
of the Ban believe that a jury trial is necessary, but the courts may have to 
determine this in the future. 
However future court decisions are made, in Arizona, a jury trial is 
not needed to effectuate the Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban. Prac-
tical reasoning says that society's most heinous crimes are felonies, and 
the lesser crimes are misdemeanors. Felonies receive harsher punish-
ments, misdemeanors are punished more lightly. Felonies receive jury 
trials, misdemeanors do not. Congress and state governments, such as 
Arizona, have taken two different roads in addressing domestic violence. 
When the States decided higher conviction rates outweighed the benefits 
of sending the message about the seriousness of domestic violence as a 
felony and dropped it to a misdemeanor, Congress responded by underlin-
ing the seriousness of domestic violence by passing the Ban, specifically 
applying it to misdemeanors. Therefore, the misdemeanor prong made 
prosecution easier, and the punishment retained the crime's seriousness. 
Sadly enough, the baby that got thrown out with the bathwater in this 
strange union of misdemenor and harsh punishment was the issue of jury 
entitlement. By focusing on the misdemeanor nature of the crime of do-
mestic violence and not addressing the punishment prong, the Arizona 
Supreme Court failed to recognize the existing balance in public policy 
concerning domestic violence and opted for the side which, when viewed 
alone, sends a message weakening the seriousness of domestic violence. 
If a determination is subsequently made that a jury trial is necessary to 
effectuate the Ban, then the Arizona Supreme Court has not only sent out 
a negative message concerning the seriousness of domestic violence in 
our community, but will have precluded the punishment which was de-
signed to send the message that domestic violence will not be tolerated 
and that victims will be protected. 
MichaelS. Wawro 
